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On 24 September 2019, the General Court (‘GC’) rendered its rst two Judgments assessing under which
circumstances EU State aid rules can curtail Member States’ sovereignty to adopt individual tax rulings. [1] In the
Starbucks Judgment discussed here, the GC ruled in favour of Starbucks since the European Commission
(‘Commission’) failed to prove the existence of an advantage within the meaning of article 107(1) TFEU. The
Judgment provides useful guidance in relation to the burden of proof the Commission has to meet to demonstrate
if and when an advantage is conferred by an individual tax ruling.
I . The parties
Starbucks Corp., headquartered in the United States, is the controlling entity of the Starbucks group.
Starbucks Manufacturing Emea BV (‘SMBV’), founded in 2001 and established in the Netherlands, is a
subsidiary of the Starbucks group. SMBV’s activities include amongst others the roasting of coffee and the sale of
coffee-derived and non-coffee products. SMBV provides these roasted coffee beans and related products to
Starbucks shops in Europe, the Middle East and Africa.
Alk i LP (‘Alk i’), established in the United Kingdom, is also a subsidiary of the Starbucks group and indirectly
controls SMBV. Alki and SMBV concluded a roasting agreement, which provides inter alia that SMBV has to pay
Alki a royalty for the use of Alki’s IP rights, including roasting methods and other roasting know-how (‘roasting IP’).
Starbucks Coffee Trading SARL (‘SCTC’), established in Switzerland, is another subsidiary of the Starbucks
group and supplies green coffee beans to SMBV.
The EU General Court clarifies the burden of proof that hasto be met by the Commission to demonstrate the existence ofan advantage in the context of tax rulings (Starbucks)
STATE AID,  NETHERLANDS ,  INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY,  AGRICULTURE / FOOD PRODUCTS ,  STATE AID
(NOTION) ,  EUROPEAN UNION,  STATE AID (TAX EXEMPTION) ,  TRANSFER PRICING,  TAXES ,  STATE AID (TAX
RUL ING)
EU General Court, Starbucks, T‑760/15 et T‑636/16, 24 September 2019 (French)
December 2019
Sander De Volder | Liège University - IEJE 
Simon Troch | Liège University - IEJE
e-Com petit ions N ews Issue Decem ber 2019
 
e-Competitions
Antitrust Case Laws e-Bulletin
This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to
3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L 335-2 CPI). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 CPI and DRM protection.
www.concurrences.com 1 Sander De Volder, Simon Troch | Concurrences | N°92638
Source: GC Judgment
I I . The facts
On 28 April 2008, the Dutch tax authorities concluded an advance pricing arrangement (‘APA’) with SMBV. Using
the transactional net margin method (‘TNMM’), a method included in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (‘OECD
Guidelines’), [2] the APA’s goal was to determine SMBV’s remuneration within the Starbucks group in conformity
with transfer pricing principles. [3] The resulting remuneration could then be used to determine SMBV’s annual
taxable profit.
In addition, the APA endorsed the amount of the royalty paid by SMBV to Alki for the use of its roasting IP. The
amount of royalties paid to Alki corresponded to the difference between the realised operating pro t and SMBV’s
remuneration as set in accordance with the APA (i.e., all pro ts generated by SMBV in excess of the percentage of
operating costs considered as SMBV’s remuneration).
On 21 October 2015, the Commission decided that the Netherlands granted unauthorized State aid to Starbucks. [4]
According to the Commission, the APA conferred an advantage as it led to a reduction in the corporate income tax
paid by SMBV compared to a stand-alone company whose taxable pro ts were determined under market
conditions. The Commission came to this conclusion as it found that the APA was not in conformity with the arm’s
length principle (‘ALP’) due to the following reasons:
The choice for the TNMM was erroneous as (i) the ruling failed to assess the intra-group transfer for which the
APA had actually been requested and granted (namely, the royalty SMBV paid to Alki for the licence to use the
roasting IP), (ii) the TNMM was not the appropriate method and if the right method – the Commission refers to
the comparable uncontrolled price method (‘CUP method’) – [5] was applied to the right intra-group transaction
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the royalty should have been zero, and (iii) unjusti ed high prices were paid to SCTC for green beans. (‘principal
position’)
The TNMM was applied incorrectly as (i) it wrongly identi ed SMBV as least complex entity, (ii) SMBV’s
functions were incorrectly analysed and the operating costs were not the right pro t level indicator; and (iii) the
adjustments to the mark-up were inappropriate. (‘subsidiary position’) Following this Decision, the Commission
ordered the Netherlands to recover approximately 30 million euros from Starbucks.
I I I . The Judgment
As indicated above, the GC ruled in favour of Starbucks since the Commission failed to prove the existence of an
advantage within the meaning of article 107(1) TFEU.
State aid and transfer price rulings –  principles
Before digging into the reasons why the Commission’s assessment in casu was erroneous, the GC sets out the
principles to determine whether a transfer pricing ruling confers a selective advantage under EU state aid rules.
Direct taxation competence of MSs within limits EU law
The GC con rms that, in line with settled case-law, direct taxation falls within the competence of the Member
States (‘MSs’). However, when exercising their competence, MSs must do so in accordance with EU law, including
State aid provisions. [6] Consequently, the Commission has the ability to check whether transfer price rulings are
compliant with State aid rules. [7]
ALP recognized as a ‘tool’ to assess whether an advantage is granted
To assess whether an individual tax ruling confers an advantage on an undertaking, the Commission can use the
ALP as a tool or benchmark enabling it to check whether intra-group transactions are remunerated as though they
had been negotiated between independent companies. In this regard, the GC further clari es that, although
formally not binding, the OECD Guidelines “have a certain practical signi cance in the interpretation of issues
relating to transfer pricing”
State aid and transfer pricing –  advantage not proven in casu
After setting out these principles, the GC assesses in more detail the various grounds demonstrating that the
Commission failed to prove that the APA conferred an advantage on Starbucks. The key teachings found in the
Commission’s assessment are set-out below.
Existence inaccuracies or mere non-compliance with methodological requirements is not su cient to prove an
advantage
When applying the ALP tool, the Commission must take into account its approximate nature. Consequently, when
the Commission identi es inaccuracies inherent to the application of a method or a mere non-compliance with
methodological requirements, this does not su ce to conclude to the existence of an advantage. Inaccuracies or
non-compliance with methodological requirements do not necessarily lead to a reduction of the tax burden.
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The GC emphasizes that the Commission should provide actual proof that the used methodology did not result in a
reliable approximation of a market-based outcome and fell outside an arm’s length range before it can conclude
that it leads to an advantage.
MSs can in general apply transfer price method they consider most appropriate
The GC starts by recalling that choosing the transfer pricing method is not an end in itself. The goal of the various
methods for setting transfer prices is the same: “attain pro t levels re ecting AL transfer prices ”. Consequently,
the Commission cannot conclude that, as a rule, a certain method does not allow a reliable approximation of an AL
outcome.
In this regard, the GC notes that the mere application of the TNMM instead of the CUP method does not confer an
advantage to SMBV. Again, the Commission should have proven that the choice of the TNMM did not lead to a
reliable approximation of a market-based outcome and fell outside an arm’s length range before it could conclude
that it leads to an advantage.
Only information known at moment of the adoption of the ruling should be taken into account
The GC rules that the Commission cannot retroactively rely on facts that are subsequent to the conclusion of the
tax ruling. The GC indicates in this regard that the Commission cannot criticise MSs to not have taken into
consideration information that was not known or reasonably foreseeable at the time of the adoption of the
agreement. The Commission needs to examine the existence of an advantage in view of the context of the time at
which the agreement was concluded. The implication of that nding is that the Commission is required to “ refrain
from assessments based on a situation subsequent to the adoption” of a ruling.
Royalty payment is defendable when not devoid of all economic rationality
When an IP is necessary for exercising an economic activity – in casu the production of roasted coffee according
to Starbucks’ speci cations –, it follows that the undertaking using the IP derives added value from the use of the
IP – in casu SMBV could not resell the roasted coffee to Starbucks stores without the roasting IP.  [8] In such
circumstances, the Commission cannot claim that the “value of the roasting IP is exploited only where the
products are sold to final consumers”. [9]
IV. Comment
Context. Since June 2013, fiscal State aid through tax rulings became one of the Commission’s main focus areas.
In addition, to the two Judgments rendered today, various enforcement actions of the Commission are pending at
different stages. In Luxembourg, an appeal lodged by Ireland against a Commission Decision ordering Ireland to
recover EUR 13 billion from Apple is pending. [10] Additional appeals are pending against Commission Decisions
concerning aid granted to Amazon and Engie by Luxembourg; and to various multinational companies by
Gibraltar. [11] The Commission itself has ongoing investigations pending with regard to the tax treatment of Ikea
and Nike by the Netherlands; and Huhtamäki by Luxembourg. [12] In addition, the Commission re-opened
investigations into various companies that bene tted from Belgian excess pro t rulings.  [13] The re-opening is the
result of a GC Judgment annulling the initial Commission Decision on procedural ground as the Commission should
have dealt with each individual ruling separately instead of with the scheme as a whole. Finally, recently
reappointed Commissioner Vestager stated that fair taxation will continue to be a focus area of EU State aid
enforcement. [14]
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Notwithstanding this continued scrutiny, tax rulings will remain omnipresent as a result of a demand for legal
certainty. Traditionally, they entail a letter of comfort on how certain companies’ corporate tax liability will be
calculated. Generally speaking, these rulings are legal and do not confer an advantage per se. Nevertheless, as
con rmed by today’s Judgments, they can violate State aid rules if the methodologies used to establish transfer
prices are not economically justified.
Main takeaways. With its Starbucks Judgment, the GC con rms the approach taken by the Commission to
assess the conformity of tax rulings with EU State aid rules. Key in this regard is the GC’s acceptance that the ALP
can be used as a tool or benchmark and that, although not legally binding, the OECD Guidelines “have a certain
practical significance in the interpretation of issues relating to transfer pricing.”
At the same time, the GC’s annulment sends a clear message to the Commission. To prove that a certain ruling
confers an advantage on an undertaking it will not be su cient to demonstrate issues with the selection or
implementation of a certain method. The Commission will have to prove that the choice for or the implementation
of a certain method did not result in a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome and fell outside an arm’s
length range before it can conclude that it leads to an advantage.
Next steps regarding Starbucks. The Commission already agged that it will not appeal the Judgment. [15]
However, it remains to be seen whether the Commission will reopen its investigation in a second attempt to
recover the alleged State aid.
[1] In addition to the Starbucks Judgment, the GC also rendered a Judgment in relation to a tax
ruling struck between Luxembourg and Fiat Chrysler that dealt with the same issue but lead to the
opposite outcome. See Joint cases T-755/15 and T-759/15, Fiat Chrysler, 24 September 2019.
[2] The purpose of the OECD Guidelines is to make sure that transactions between intra-group
companies are remunerated in line with transactions that take place between independent companies.
[3] The APA stated that SMBV’s remuneration had to be determined on the basis of the cost plus
method – the chosen profit level indicator for application of the TNMM thus being operating costs
–, and that it was at arm’s length if the ‘operating margin’ reached a certain percentage of the
relevant cost base. In accordance with the OECD Guidelines, when applying the TNMM account
should be taken of net margins being received in comparable transactions by non-affiliated
companies. With the conclusion of the APA, the Netherlands confirmed that the use of the TNMMin casu was in accordance with the arm’s length principle.
[4] Decision (EU) 2017/502 of 21 October 2015 on State aid SA.38374, implemented by the
Netherlands to Starbucks (OJ 2017 L 83. p. 38).
[5] The CUP method is a traditional transaction method which compares the price charged for the
transfer of property or services in a transaction between two associated undertakings with the price
charged for the transfer of property or services in a comparable transaction carried out in
comparable circumstances between two independent undertakings.
[6] See for example C-269/09, Commission v Spain, 12 July 2012, paragraph 47 and the case-law
 
This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to
3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L 335-2 CPI). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 CPI and DRM protection.
www.concurrences.com 5 Sander De Volder, Simon Troch | Concurrences | N°92638
[6] See for example C-269/09, Commission v Spain, 12 July 2012, paragraph 47 and the case-law
cited.
[7] See for example C‑182/03 and C‑217/03, Forum 187, 22 June 2006, paragraph 81.
[8] In this regard, the GC further states that “The question of who ultimately bears the costscorresponding to the compensation of the value of the IP used for coffee production is clearlyseparate from the question of whether the roasting IP was necessary to allow SMBV to produceroasted coffee according to the criteria stipulated by Starbucks stores, to which it sells, on its ownbehalf, the coffee.”
[9] In this regard, the GC also further clarifies that “The question of who ultimately bears the costscorresponding to the compensation of the value of the IP used for coffee production is clearlyseparate from the question of whether the roasting IP was necessary to allow SMBV to produceroasted coffee according to the criteria stipulated by Starbucks stores, to which it sells, on its ownbehalf, the coffee.”
[10] T-778/16, Ireland v Commission, pending.
[11] SA.44888 – Aid to Engie; SA.38944 – Aid to Amazon – Luxembourg; SA.34914 – UK-
Gibraltar Corporate Tax Regime.
[12] Case SA.46470 – potential aid to IKEA – NL; Case SA.51284 – alleged aid to Nike; Case
SA.50400 – Huhtamäki.
[13] See the Commission’s press release regarding the opening of 39 separate investigation into the
companies benefiting from an excess profit ruling in Belgium, available at:https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-5578_en.htm . Note that the Commission appealed
the Judgment of the GC in parallel.
[14] Statement by Commissioner Margrethe Vestager of 24 September 2019, available at:https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-19-5831_en.htm
[15] Mlex report ‘Starbucks’ EU court victory on tax bill to go unchallenged, Vestager says’, 27
November 2019, Mlex.
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